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LESSONS UNLEARNED:
THE EFFECTS OF STATUTORY AMBIGUITY
AND THE INTERPRETATIVE UNCERTAINTY IT
INJECTS IN THE COURTS
Carolyn Singh*
INTRODUCTION

For centuries, courts have dealt with the challenge of imposing
penalties for crimes when governing law changes. Applying the new
provisions can be a straightforward exercise for courts, but when
legislatures are ambiguous with regard to which law applies-for
example, to pending cases-the courts are forced to interpret what
legislatures intended. For some judges, the answer is easily found in
the plain meaning of the text. For others, legislative intent can become
the deciding factor. Throughout United States history, this has been a
manageable yet controversial task, but aside from interpretive
differences among judges, creating laws with uncertainty is a
dangerous policy that legislatures should end.
Because some cases with the most adverse effects involve federal
criminal statutes, this paper argues that in light of the high stakes
involved for criminal defendants, clear statutory language is required
for the efficient administration of justice. It does so by first examining
consequences of statutory ambiguity and the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 (FSA),' which was enacted after almost twenty-four years of an
unfair law taking effect. Tens of thousands of individuals were
convicted under the old law, which remained in effect despite its
disparate treatment of certain drug offenders. But even when the
Carolyn Singh, J.D., MBA, is a graduate of the University of
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I Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8, 124 Stat. 2372
(2010).

United States Congress corrected the disparity by enacting the FSA, it
left ambiguity in the legislation regarding retroactivity and the FSA's
application to pending cases, which would qualify defendants for
reduced sentences or elimination of their convictions altogether. Most
individuals sentenced under existing law would have already
completed their prison sentences if the FSA were applied retroactively.
Second, by examining the FSA, a comparison is made with
federal and state gun control legislation, general principles of statutory
interpretation, and the need for legislatures to clearly communicate
with the courts. Because judges may apply varying interpretive
philosophies, legislatures must be explicit when they write laws in
order to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Otherwise, the role of a judge may arguably extend into effectively
legislating from the bench.
I. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST RETROACTIVITY
When Congress enacts or amends a statute, it may indicate the
effect to be either prospective or retroactive, or remain silent on the
issue. A prospective statute operates from the effective date noted in
the statute. 2 A retroactive statute is backward-looking in the sense that
it upsets vested rights3 or changes the legal consequence attached to
conduct and transactions that have already occurred. 4 An intermediate,
quasi-retroactive analysis is needed for cases that are pending when a
statute changes. 5 When Congress is silent on the issue of retroactivity,
courts must evaluate whether
applying the statute would have an
6
effect.
retroactive
undesirable
A. GeneralPrinciples of Statutory Interpretation
When determining statutory context and purpose, courts must
begin by looking to the text of the statute itself. Courts first follow this
"plain meaning" rule, and if the language of the statute is clear, there is
2 Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 42 S. Ct. 72, 75

(1921).

3 When determining the constitutionality of retrospective statutes, such
legislation may not abrogate vested rights, which are rights vested when it has been
so far perfected that it cannot be taken away by statute. Bryant Smith, Retroactive
Laws and Vested Rights , 5 TEXAS L. REV. 231, 245-48 (1927).
4 Id.
5 Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012).
6 Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).

no need to look beyond the statute to its legislative history in order to
determine its meaning. 7 In general, a statute should be read as a whole,
with its parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context
and in a manner
that furthers its statutory purposes, rather than
8
undercuts them.
Courts also look to "words at issue, to surrounding text, to the
statute's history, to legal traditions, to precedent, to the statute's
purposes, and to its consequences evaluated in light of those
purposes." 9 When a statute is ambiguous, judges commonly use two
approaches: textualism, which looks to the plain meaning of the
statute, and a purpose-driven approach, which relies on congressional
intent.10 These two approaches dominate views of justices and have
been debated for decades. Notably, Supreme Court justices have
commented with different views on the balance of statutory
interpretation. Justice Stephen Breyer supports a purpose-driven
interpretation based on congressional intent, whereas Justice Antonin
Scalia maintains that statutory interpretation should be focused on the
plain meaning of the legislative text without extrinsic influence.ii
1. Purpose-Driven Approach
To support his purpose-driven view, Justice Breyer believes that
the Court should read language "as the revelation of the great purposes
which are intended to be achieved," 12 and should "reconstruct the past
solution imaginatively in its setting and project the purposes which
inspired it upon the concrete occasions which arise from their
decision."' 13 Because law is connected to life, it requires judges to
apply a text in light of its purpose to achieve its overall public policy
objectives. 14 Justice Breyer believes that contemporary conditions and
7 STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE'S
VIEW

88-

102 (Vintage 2010).
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 STEPHEN BREYER,

ACTIVE LIBERTY:

INTERPRETING

OUR

CONSTITUTION 85-88 (Vintage 2005) [hereinafter ACTIVE LIBERTY].
11 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING

DEMOCRATIC

LAW:

THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS xxvii (West 2012) [hereinafter READING LAW].
12 ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 17-18.
13

Id. at 18 (quoting Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent

Judiciary to Civilization, in JURISPRUDENCE IN ACTION 228 (1953).
14 Id. at 17-18 (citing THE WORDS OF JUSTICE BRANDEIS 61, 115 (Solomon
Goldman ed., 1953); Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905); LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF

social, industrial, and political consequences to be affected in a
community are important: "nothing that is logically relevant should be
excluded."' 15 This is important, he believes, because focusing solely on
textual language "can lead courts astray, divorcing law from lifeindeed, creating law that harms those whom Congress meant to
help."' 16 Justice Breyer has said the following regarding instances
where statutory language is unclear:
[There is a] danger that lurks where judges rely too
heavily upon just text and textual aids when
interpreting a statute . . . when difficult statutory
questions are at issue, courts do better to focus
foremost upon statutory purpose, ruling out neither
legislative history nor any other form of help in order
to locate the role that Congress intended the statutory
words in question to play.iV
2. Textual Approach
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, supports a text-oriented
approach to statutory interpretation, focusing on a "fair reading" of
legislative text, history, tradition, and precedent, which is aimed at the
decision-making void of an individual judge's policy preferences, and
i
strictly adheres to the textual language provided by the legislature. s
This textual approach is based on the constitutional mandate that
"legislators enact; judges interpret." 19 Adhering to strict textual
LIBERTY 109, 157 (3d ed. 1960); Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 316 (1941); Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The
Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 28 (2002) ("The
law regulates relationships between people. It prescribes patterns of behavior. It
reflects the values of society. The role of the judge is to understand the purpose of
law in society and to help the law achieve its purpose."); Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 541 (1947); Felix
Frankfurter, The Supreme Court In The Mirror Of Justices, in OF LAW AND LIFE &
OTHER THINGS THAT MATTER 94-95 (Phillip B. Kurland ed., 1965); New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)).
15ACTIVE LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 18.
16 Id. at 85.
17 Id. at 98.
is READING LAW, supra note 11, at xxvii.
19 Id. at xxx (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States ....")). See also U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one

interpretation and fair implications of the text ensures that the20 power
of the judiciary does not prevail over the will of the legislature.
Furthermore, proponents of this approach believe that substituting
purpose for text is dangerous; for example, looking to non-textual
material, such as legislative history, manipulates statutory construction
and therefore enables justices to legislate from the bench.21
Perhaps a holistic medium between the purpose-driven and textual
approaches would best serve legislative intent. As Chief Justice Taney
explained: "In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy., 22 However, in instances
where legislation is ambiguous or silent with regard to an element of
statutory text, courts are forced to go beyond that level of analysis.
Keeping in mind that Congress is aware of the rules of statutory
construction, Congress's silence, in some instances, could signify that
nothing more is needed to be said to effectuate a statute. In other
instances, Congress may not have considered the issue, 23 or is enacting
emergency legislation to take effect "as soon as practicable." 2 4
B. Retroactive Statutes

In recent years, courts have increasingly dealt with an additional
wrinkle when it comes to ambiguous statutes: retroactivity. Examples
of retroactive statutes include those remedying unexpected judicial
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish."); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The
interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts.").
20 READING LAW, supra at note 11, at xxix (citing Osborn v. Bank of the U.S.,

22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824)). See also

LACKLAND H. BLOOM JR., METHODS OF
INTERPRETATION: How THE SUPREME COURT READS THE CONSTITUTION (Oxford

Univ. Press 2009) (stating "for Marshall the underlying rationale for judicial review
itself was dependent on an understandable and legally applicable text.").
21 READING LAW, supra note 11, at 18 (citing Harris v. Commissioner, 178
F.2d 861, 864 (2nd Cir. 1949) ("It is always a dangerous business to fill in the text of
a statute from its purposes.")). See also Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 538 (8th Cir.
1966) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he recognized purpose and aim of the statute
are more consistently and protectively to be served if the statute is construed literally
and objectively rather than non-literally and subjectively on a case-by-case
application.").
22 United States v. Boisdore's Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850).
23 Id.

24 Federal Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 8, 124 Stat. 2372

(2010).

decisions in order to effectuate the intentions of parties, and legislative
changes that may be more responsive to the needs of a particular
situation. Retroactive statutes can take the form of an ex post facto
law, or an ameliorative statutory change in the form of a new,
amended, or repealed statute.2 5
1. Ex Post Facto Laws
An ex post facto law applies retroactively to negatively affect or
impair a person's rights. The United States Constitution prohibits
federal and state governments from enacting ex postfacto laws. 26 For
the Founding Fathers, this prohibition was rooted in principles
favoring personal security and private rights in order to avoid
fluctuating policy and to give a regular course to the business of
society. 27 The contrary policy was characterized by the violence and
injustice that resulted from the Parliament of Great Britain declaring
acts to be treason that were not treason when committed. 2 8 Thus, the
framers of the Constitution sought to secure citizens from injury or
punishment in consequence of such laws.
In addition, ex postfacto laws are generally prohibited because the
enacting of any law after the fact could greatly restrict the power of
federal and state legislatures. 29 Examples of prohibitions against ex
post facto laws are increasing punishment, removing a defense that
was previously available, and applying rules of evidence or procedure
25 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1432 (9th ed. 2009) defines retroactive law as:

"A legislative act that looks backward or contemplates the past, affecting acts or
facts that existed before the act came into effect. A retroactive law is not
unconstitutional unless it (1) is in the nature of an ex post facto law or bill of
attainder, (2) impairs the obligation of contracts, (3) divests vested rights, or (4) is
constitutionally forbidden."
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-9. The expostfacto clause applies only to criminal
statutes and not to judicial decisions that have retroactive effect. Frank v. Magnum,
237 U.S. 309 (1915). In addition, a U.S. Supreme Court decision creating a new
constitutional right or rejecting a previous position is fully retroactive to all pending
cases. Such cases are examined under the due process framework, not as an expost
facto prohibition. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 455 (2001). In the criminal
context, a completed case or conviction may be abated if the crime is decriminalized
or if the punishment is unfair in light of the new rule. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989).
27 THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison).
21 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389 (1798) (citing the Case of the Earl of
Strafford (1641)).
29 Id. at 394.

that would make it easier to obtain a conviction. In the criminal
context, ex post facto laws are impermissible, whereas in the civil
context, they are permitted.30
2. Ameliorative Statutory Changes
An ameliorative statutory change, by contrast, seeks to decrease
the consequence or penalty associated with a statutory violation. 3 1 The
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 is an example of an ameliorative statute in
that it seeks to remedy an unfair sentencing disparity between
32
offenders based on the quantity of crack versus cocaine possession.
One of the earliest Supreme Court cases to address ex post facto
laws and the presumption against retroactivity is Calder v. Bull. 33 The
case involved a bequest in a will made on August 21, 1779, for
property to Caleb Bull and his wife. On May 2, 1795, the Connecticut
legislature changed the applicable law that was originally enacted on
March 21, 1793, which resulted in a refusal to record the will that
allowed Calder and his wife to claim the property.3 4 Writing for the
Court, Justice Chase noted the distinction between retrospective and ex
postfacto law:
Every ex post facto law must necessarily be
retrospective; but every retrospective law is not an ex
post facto law: The former, only, are prohibited.
Every law that takes away, or impairs, rights vested,
agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective, and is
generally unjust; and may be oppressive; and it is a
good general rule, that a law should have no
retrospect: but there are cases in which laws may
justly, and for the benefit of the community, and also
of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their
commencement; as statutes of oblivion, or of pardon.
They are certainly retrospective, and literally both
concerning, and after, the facts committed. But I do
30

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

496-502 (4th ed. 2011) (The ex post facto clause does not apply to deportation
proceedings because they are characterized as civil.).
31 People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956).
32 Fair Sentencing Act §
8.
33 Calder,3 U.S. at 386.
34

id.

not consider any law ex post facto, within the
prohibition, that mollifies the rigor of the criminal
law; but only those that create, or aggravate, the
crime; or encrease [sic] the punishment, or change the
rules of evidence, for the purpose of conviction.
Every law that is to have an operation before the
making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent
time; or to save time from the statute of limitations; or
to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before
committed, and the like; is retrospective. But such
laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be.
There is a great and apparent difference between
making an UNLAWFUL act LAWFUL; and the
making an innocent action criminal, and punishing it
as a CRIME.35
Another general principle is that courts apply the law in effect at
the time their decisions are rendered. 36 Although conduct that triggers
criminal prosecution predates amendment, such amendments apply to
ongoing rather than completed proceedings, which would otherwise
have the disfavored retroactive effect of an ex postfacto laws.
3. Abatement versus Repeal
In addition, when a statute is abated by repeal, no penalty can be
enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law committed
while it was in force unless some provision is made. 38 The general
saving statute 39 gives the government authority to continue ongoing
prosecutions, whereas pending prosecutions would be "technically
abated" when the statute subject of the prosecution is amended. This
concept of technical abatement is a common law rule that prevents
40
prosecution of offenses committed prior to a statutory amendment.
"5Id. at 391.
36 Landgraf,511 U.S. at 263-64.
37 Id.
38 Yeaton v. United States, 9 U.S. 281 (1809) (After the expiration or repeal of

a law, no penalty can be enforced, nor punishment inflicted, for violations of the law
committed while it was in force, unless some special provision be made for that
purpose by statute).
39 1 U.S.C. § 109 (1947).
40 An example of technical abatement is the case of The King.
v. M'Kenzie,
168 Eng. Rep. 881 (Cr. Cas. 1820). The defendants were convicted of "feloniously

Statutory abatement, following the enactment of the general saving
statute, applies to pending criminal proceedings to preserve the
government's ability to continue prosecution and thereby prevent
technical abatement while simplifying the enactment process for future
legislators:
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to
release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or
liability incurred under such statute, unless the
repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such
statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for
the purpose of sustaining any proper action or
prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty,
forfeiture, or liability.4 1
In instances when Congress creates a statute lacking a saving
clause, portions with ex postfacto effect may be applicable to pending

cases. 42
By contrast, when a statutory provision becomes deprived of
force, abatement is proper. For example, with the repeal of the
Eighteenth Amendment by the Twenty-first Amendment of the United
States Constitution, prohibition ended.4 3
C. When Congress is Silent on Retroactivity
In the absence of a congressional mandate for prospective or
retroactive interpretation of a statute, application of a new statute to
cases arising before its enactment is unquestionably proper in many
stealing . . . on the 11th of July, 1820, twenty-three yards of lace, value one pound
three shillings ...." Id. However, on July 25, 1820, Parliament amended the grand
larceny statute, reducing the penalty from death to life imprisonment. The English
court held that the defendants could not be held liable under either statute-the new
one because it was enacted after the crime and the old one because it had been
effectively repealed. Id. See also Dorsey, 132 S.Ct. at 2321.
41 1 U.S.C. § 109 (emphasis added).
42 Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 37-38 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
("[O]nly the ex post facto portion of the new law is void as to petitioner, and
therefore any severable portions which are not ex post facto may still be applied to
him.").
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2 (repealed 1933) ("[T]he manufacture, sale,
or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction
thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited."). See also United States v.
Chambers, 291 U.S. 217 (1934).

situations.'4 And, as a guiding principle against retroactivity, courts
read laws as prospective unless Congress unambiguously instructs
retroactivity.45 The general rule is that courts must apply the law in
effect at the time it renders a decision, 46 and in Landgraf,the Supreme
Court addressed the presumption against retroactivity, noting that
when a statute would impair rights that a party possessed when he or
she acted, increase liability for past conduct, or impose new duties
with respect to transactions already
completed, the statute would have
47
effect.
retroactive
an unfavorable
In Landgraf, the Court examined whether applying a new
provision under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 199148 would give
Landgraf the right to recover compensatory and punitive damages and
provide for trial by jury if such damages were claimed while her case
was pending on appeal. The lower court dismissed her case, holding
that although she had been sexually harassed, the harassment did not
justify her resignation; therefore, the termination of her employment
was not in violation of Title VII and she was unable to obtain equitable
relief. She appealed. While her case was pending on appeal, the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 became law, and it contained a provision that
created the right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for
intentional Title VII discrimination, among other things. 49 The new
provision did not include a prohibition against retroactivity, nor did
Congress indicate whether it was precluded from application to
pending cases.50
In determining whether applying the new provision would have
the disfavored retroactive effect, the Court noted that punitive and
compensatory damages were new legal consequences attached to preenactment conduct, and would therefore have the disfavored
retroactive effect if applied to her case: "Elementary considerations of
fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know
44 Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974). Bradley v. United

States, 410 U.S. 605 (1973). Narcotic offenses (convictions and sentences)
committed prior to effective date of Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1286 (1970), which repealed and
liberalized sentencing, was not available in view of its saving clause, which made it
inapplicable to such convictions/sentences antedating the Act's effective date.
45 Landgraf,511 U.S. at 263.
46 id.
47

Id. at 245.

48 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
49 Landgraf,511 U.S. at 247.
50

id.

what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled
expectations should not be lightly disrupted." 51
More recently, in the context of immigration, the Supreme Court
held a consistent view 52 with regard to immigration requirements for
deportation prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). 53 Under the IIRIRA, Congress
expressly stated that the statute would not apply retroactively. 54 Prior
to the IIRIRA, U.S. immigration law provided deportation hearings for
excludable aliens who had already entered the United States, and
exclusion hearings for excludable aliens seeking entry into the United
States.55 The IIRIRA permitted automatic exclusion, for example, as a
result of a prior felony conviction. In Vartelas, Pagagis Vartelas was a
lawful permanent resident alien, a native and citizen of Greece, whose
petition for review of removal proceedings was denied. 56 In 1994,
Vartelas plead guilty to a felony and served a four-month prison
sentence. In 1996, the IIRIRA became law and was applied
retroactively, denying Vartelas's 2003 re-entry to the United States.
Vartelas appealed, and in 2012 the Supreme Court denied the
government's retroactive application of the IIRIRA
because it created
57
intent.
congressional
to
contrary
a new disability
Writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia distinguished his
interpretation of the triggering activity for determining retroactivity as
Vartelas's 1996 return trip, not the crime for which he plead guilty in
51 Id. at 265 (citing General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191(1992)

("Retroactive legislation presents problems of unfairness that are more serious than
those posed by prospective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of legitimate
expectations and upset settled transactions")).
52 Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012) (In this 6-3 decision,
Justice
Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined).
51 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (1996).
54 Id.
55 Vartelas, 132 S.Ct. at 1479.
56 Id.
57 Id.at 1481-82 (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265 (The presumption against

retroactive legislation "embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our
Republic.")). Numerous decisions of this Court have invoked Justice Story's
formulation for determining when a law's retrospective application would collide
with the doctrine, namely, as relevant here, when such application "attaches a new
disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past ...." Soc'y for
Propagation of Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767 (1814). See, e.g., INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520
U.S. 939, 947; Landgraf,511 U.S. at 283.

1994, which
would trigger exclusion under the not yet effective
58
IIRIRA.
II. DORSEY V. UNITED STATES AND HILL V. UNITED STATES
On June 21, 2012, about three months after the Supreme Court
released its opinion in Vartelas, the Court addressed the same issue of
statutory interpretation in Dorsey and Hill when it examined
the FSA' s
59
(ADAA).
1986
of
Act
Abuse
Anti-Drug
repeal of the
A. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of]986
Under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (ADAA), federal
offenses involving certain quantities of drugs were subject to
mandatory minimum sentences.
It created a disparity between
sentences associated with crack and powder forms of cocaine by
treating every gram of crack cocaine as the equivalent of 100 grams of
powder cocaine. 6 1 The ADAA was drafted and enacted within a four
month period in response to a notable rise in cocaine-related deaths,
notably the deaths of Len Bias of the University of Maryland and Don
Rogers of the Cleveland Browns. 62 Congress was urged to act swiftly,
and they did with the intention of assigning greater punishment to
offenders with crack cocaine in their possession. There was no
research or scientific evidence that supported the 100:1 ratio, but the
58

Vartelas, 132 S. Ct. at 1496 (stating "This case raises a plain-vanilla
question of statutory interpretation, not broader questions about frustrated
expectations or fairness. Our approach to answering that question should be similarly
straightforward: We should determine what relevant activity the statute regulates
(here, reentry); absent a clear statement otherwise, only such relevant activity which
occurs after the statute's effective date should be covered (here, post-1996 reentries). If, as so construed, the statute is unfair or irrational enough to violate the
Constitution, that is another matter entirely, and one not presented here. Our
interpretive presumption against retroactivity, however, is just that-a tool to
ascertain what the statute means, not a license to rewrite the statute in a way the
Court considers more desirable.").
59 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
60 Id.
61 Brief for Ctr. on the Admin. of Criminal Law, New York University School
of Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners 6-7, Dorsey v. United States, 132
S. Ct. 2321 (2012) (Nos. 11-5683, 11-5721), 2012 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 426
(citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 122 (1995)).
62

Id.

ADAA was nevertheless enacted to target major drug traffickers and
combat the perceived levels of violence and social harms, and because
crack was thought to be more addictive and lethal.63
After the ADAA's enactment, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
issued several reports urging Congress to reassess the 100:1 ratio
because it was not justified. 64 Of note, the penalty did not achieve the
goal of prosecuting major cocaine traffickers. The opposite resulted:
street dealers of crack were punished more frequently and severely
than the major dealers of powdered forms of cocaine. Moreover,
subsequent studies showed that there was no increase in violence as
initially thought, and that crack was not 100 times more harmful than
powder cocaine. The psychological effects were similar, the risks of
dependence were similar, and 65using crack turned out to be more
addictive than snorting cocaine.
After the ADAA was enacted, an amendment in 2007
retroactively lowered the base offense level applicable for crack
offenses. With that amendment, 16,000 of the 25,000 requested
sentence reductions were granted. 66 Perhaps one of the more alarming
consequences is the social impact associated with the ADAA, which
resulted in a disproportionate rate of incarceration of African
Americans. Statistics from the U.S. Sentencing Commission estimate
that 1,056,855 individuals were sentenced under the ADAA between
67
1992 and 2009. Data from 2009 alone shows that 79% of the 5,669
sentenced crack offenders were black, whereas 10% were white and
10% were Hispanic. 68 The figures for powder cocaine offenders
showed a different distribution: 17% were white, 28% were black, and
53% were Hispanic. In addition, average prison terms for crack
convictions were69 115 months, whereas powder cocaine convictions
were 87 months.
63

Id.

6 Id.
65

Id.

§ 3E1.1 (2011).
Id. at 11-17. The manual also estimates that with the enactment of the Fair

66 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
67

Sentencing Act (FSA), 29,455 offenders would be eligible for reduced prison
sentences. In addition, the top ten states with offenders eligible for reduced sentences
under the FSA are: Virginia, Florida, South Carolina, Texas, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
New York, Alabama, Missouri, and Maryland.
68 Id.
69

Danielle Kurtzleben, Data Show Racial Disparityin Crack Sentencing, U.S.

NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 3,

2010, http://www.usnews.comnnews/articles/
2010/08/03/data-show-racial-disparity-in-crack-sentencing.

B. The FairSentencing Act of 2010

In 2010, over two decades after it was passed, Congress repealed
the ADAA70 by enacting the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA),
which reduced the crack-powder ratio from 100:1 to 18:1 to apply to
all sentences after its enactment. 71 The FSA was signed into law
August 3, 2010, because Congress realized that there was an unfair
disparity in the conviction rates for individuals found guilty of
possessing crack cocaine as opposed to cocaine powder. Congress
intended the changes to apply as soon as possible. Congress also
directed the Sentencing Commission to update its guidelines no later
than November 1, 2010. Although the FSA reduced the disparity
between crack and powder forms to 18:1, and eliminated the
mandatory minimum sentencing for simple possession, among other
things, thousands of individuals were convicted under a statute that has
since been deprived of force.
When Congress enacted the FSA, it was silent on whether the
FSA applied prospectively or retroactively, but mandated its
immediate application without an explicit answer 72
about whether the
new penalties would apply to ongoing prosecutions.
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that because the
FSA was passed, the prison population will decrease by 1,550 persons
per year over the 2011-2015 period.73 In addition, the federal prison
system's spending is estimated to be reduced by $42 million over the
2011-2015 time frame, which correlates to savings of about $27,000
per year for each person who avoided incarceration time as a result of
the FSA.7 4
70 Prior to the FSA's enactment, under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,

certain U.S. federal criminal penalties could result from possessing a crack-topowder weight ratio of 100:1 because crack cocaine was believed to be more potent
than cocaine powder. Convictions could result in a 5-year mandatory minimum
sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
71 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.
72 Based on the reasoning in Landgraf,when Congress is silent, a prospective
application is required. Landgraf,511 U.S. at 263.
73 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S. 1789, FAIR SENTENCING ACT OF
2010 (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/114xx/
docll4l3/s1789.pdf (A person-year measures the incarceration of one person for a
full year).
74 Id.

C. Dorsey and Hill
In Dorsey and Hill, the Supreme Court held that more lenient
penalties of the FSA, which reduced the crack-to-powder cocaine
disparity, applied to those offenders whose crimes preceded the
effective date of the Act and were sentenced after the statute's
effective date, abrogating United States v. Sidney,75 and United States
v. Tickles.7 6 The Court also held that the more lenient penalties applied
to those offenders who committed an offense prior to the FSA's
effective date and were sentenced after such date, but before the new
sentencing guidelines concerning the disparity took effect. 77 The
Court's decision in Dorsey78 also vacated and remanded forty-three
cases in circuit courts of appeal.
1. Fisher & Dorsey Consolidated in the Seventh Circuit-The Bell
Standard
Fisher was a consolidation of two cases against Anthony Fisher
from Wisconsin and Edward Dorsey from Illinois before the Seventh
Circuit. Fisher was decided based on the Seventh Circuit precedent set
in Bell, which declined the retroactive application79of the FSA because
Congress did not expressly mandate retroactivity.
Anthony Fisher plead guilty in February 2010 to one count of
conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. He disputed the amount of
crack in question, but was sentenced on June 2, 2010, without the
quantity dispute being resolved, to the 120 month mandatory minimum
based on the quantity Fisher claimed: 50 to 150 grams. 81 For the Bell
75 United States v. Sidney, 648 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2011).
76

United States v. Tickles, 661 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2011).

77 The Supreme Court in Dorsey held that it applied prospectively with new

penalties to apply to ongoing prosecutions.
78 Dorsey v. United States (No. 11-5683) was consolidated with Hill v. United
States (No. 11-5721).
79 United States v. Bell, 624 F.3d 803 (2010) ("The [FSA] amended the
Controlled Substances Act . . . by resetting the drug quantities required to trigger
mandatory minimum sentences. . . . the minimum quantity of crack required to
trigger the mandatory minimum sentence from 5 grams to 28 grams .... " did not
apply retroactively to defendant convicted of distributing 5.69 grams of crack
cocaine prior to enactment of the FSA, where the FSA did not provide for its
retroactive application. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2010); 1 U.S.C. § 109).
so Fisher v. United States, 635 F.3d 336 (2011).
"' Id. at 338.

2
court, the triggering activity was the date the crime was committed.8
Fisher appealed, claiming the FSA should apply because his appeal
was pending on August 3, 2010, when the FSA went into effect. Fisher
requested that the FSA be applied retroactively to his sentence, noting
the Seventh Circuit's prior holding in Bell.83 Bell was convicted and
sentenced, and had an appeal pending when the FSA went into effect.
In Bell, the Court applied the savings statute, barring the retroactive
FSA application to Bell's appeal. The Seventh Circuit noted that other
circuit courts of appeals declined to apply the FSA retroactively
because such an application was barred by the savings statute.
Edward Dorsey pleaded guilty to possessing 5.5 grams of crack
cocaine with the intent to distribute on August 6, 2008.8 4 With
Dorsey's prior conviction, he was subject to the ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence. If he were sentenced under the FSA, the ten-year
mandatory minimum sentence would be triggered only if he possessed
28 grams or more of crack.85 He was sentenced on September 10,
2010, after the FSA took effect, to the mandatory minimum sentence
of 120 months. s6 The Court declined to apply the FSA, noting that the
crime was committed prior to the FSA's enactment.
Dorsey argued that even if the saving statute prevents retroactive
application of the FSA, the relevant date for determining retroactivity
is the date of sentencing, not the date of the commission of the
criminal act, and that based on congressional intent and for reasons of
fairness, his claim is distinguished from Bell; therefore, the FSA
should apply to his conviction.87 In other words, the relief he sought
was prospective and therefore consistent with the FSA. In Bell, the
Seventh Circuit held that the savings statute prohibits the FSA from
applying retroactively because Congress was silent on retroactivity ands
there was no expression in the statute that it applied retroactively.
Dorsey argued that when considering the applicability of the saving
statute, retroactivity is to be denied unless Congress expressly
prohibits it.8 9 Since Congress was silent on retroactivity in the FSA,

82 Bell, 624 F.3d at 813.

" Id. at 814.

84 Brief for Petitioner at 11, Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012)
(Nos. 11 -5683 and 11 -5721),2012 WL 259396.
15 Id. at 7.
86

Id. at 12-13.

87

Id. at 11-15.

88 Bell, 624 F.3d at 815.
89 See Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908).

Dorsey argued for prospective application and for the FSA to apply to
his case because his case was pending when the FSA became the law.
2. Hill-The Seventh Circuit and The Bell Standard
Corey Hill was arrested on June 19, 2008, for delivery of 53
grams of cocaine base and sentenced to 120 months imprisonment on
December 2, 2010.90 If the FSA were applied to Hill, he would have
faced the mandatory minimum sentence of five years, rather than the
ten-year sentence he faced. 9 1 Based on the Bell standard set in the

Seventh Circuit, Hill's motion to reconsider his sentence was denied.92
3. Dorsey and Hill in the Supreme Court
Both Dorsey and Hill 93 petitioned the Supreme Court to hear their

cases because the Seventh Circuit's Bell standard was in conflict with
the First 94 and Eleventh 95 Circuits, as well as forty-five district courts
based on a different statutory interpretation. 96 In addition, the United

States government agreed with Dorsey and Hill that the Seventh
Circuit's bar to applying the FSA was unfair. On July 15, 2011,
Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memorandum expressing that
view:
In light of the differing court decisions-and the
serious impact on the criminal justice system of
90 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2-3, 6, Hill v. United States (No. 11-5721),

2011 WL 5909899.
9' Id. at 8- 10.

92 Id. at 6.

93 Dorsey's petition was filed on August 1, 2011, and Hill's was filed on July
1, 2011. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dorsey v. United States (No. 11 -5683),
2011 WL 5909896; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hill v. United States (No.115721), 2011 WL 5909899.
94 United States v. Douglas, 644 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011) (The First Circuit held
that the FSA applies to criminal defendants sentenced after November 1, 2010,
regardless of when the criminal act was committed. This was based on the statutory
direction for the U.S. Sentencing Commission to promulgate guidelines within 90
days of the FSA's enactment).
95 United States v. Rojas, 645 F.3d 1234 (1 lth Cir. 2011) (The Eleventh Circuit
held that the FSA applies to sentencing conducted after the August 3, 2010, date of
enactment, regardless of when the crime was committed).
96 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dorsey v. United States (Nos. 11 -5683, 115721).

continuing to impose unfair penalties-I have
reviewed our position regarding the applicability of
the Fair Sentencing Act to cases sentenced on or after
the date of enactment. While I continue to believe
that the Savings Statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, precludes
application of the new mandatory minimums to those
sentenced before the enactment of the Fair Sentencing
Act, I agree with those courts that have held that
Congress intended the Act not only to "restore
fairness in federal cocaine sentencing policy" but to
do so as expeditiously as possible and to all
defendants sentenced on or after the enactment date.
As a result, I have concluded that the law requires the
application of the Act's new mandatory minimum
sentencing provisions to all sentencings that occur on
or after August 3, 2010, regardless of when the
offense conduct took place. The law draws the line at
August 3, however. The new provisions do not apply
to sentences imposed prior to that date, whether or not
they are final. Prosecutors are directed
to act
97
consistently with these legal principles.
With the government's support of the Dorsey-Hill petitions for
writs of certiorari, the Court appointed amicus curiae in support of the
judgments from the Seventh Circuit. The court-appointed amicus
curiae brief put forth the argument that petitioners were sentenced in
accordance with the law at the time of their offenses, which predated
the FSA and therefore the FSA's mandatory minimum sentences
should not apply. To support its argument, it was noted that the
"Supreme Court has never held any change in a criminal penalty to be
partially retroactive ... the choice has always been binary: retroactive

or prospective." 98 In addition, section 109, "says that only an 'express'
provision in a later statute can support retroactivity." 99 Taking a
textual approach to interpretation, it was argued that the Court does not
97 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, to
All Federal Prosecutors (July 15, 2011), http://sentencing.typepad.comfiles/holderfsa-memo-7.15.11.pdf (application of the statutory mandatory minimum sentencing
laws for crack cocaine offenses amended by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010).
98 Brief for Miguel Estrada et al. as Amici Curiae at Request of the Court,
Dorsey v. United States, 32 S. Ct. at 2321 (2012) (Nos. 11-5683, 11-5721) 2012 WL
765218 (2012) (citing United States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445, 446 (7th Cir. 2011)).
99 Holcomb, 657 F.3d at 448.

give "authoritative weight" to "legislative
history that is in no way
1 00
statute."
the
of
text
the
in
anchored
In sum, the Seventh Circuit argued that the FSA does not apply
retroactively to criminal defendants whose conduct occurred before the
FSA's effective date, regardless of when they were sentenced. 10 1
4. The Supreme Court's Opinion in Dorsey and Hill
In a 5-4 decision, 10 2 the Court ruled in favor of the petitioners,
agreeing with the government's new position that the new, lower
mandatory minimum sentences of FSA applies to post-FSA sentencing
of conduct predating the FSA. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
noted that applying the more lenient penalties to those sentenced after
August 3, 2012, made it possible to foresee a reasonably smooth
transition. 103 Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, described concerns
104
of unpredictability that it creates for future interpretation of law.
Congress intended the more lenient penalties of the FSA to apply
to offenders whose conduct occurred before August 3, 2010, and were
sentenced after. Using the purpose-driven principles of interpretation,
the Court concluded that Congress did intend for the FSA's more
lenient penalties to pre-FSA conduct, and would have clearly indicated
to the contrary if it did not. This was supported by the reasoning that a
contrary holding would 105
undermine the FSA's objective to achieve
uniformity in sentencing.
On the issue of retroactivity, the Court noted two seemingly
conflicting statutes: the general saving statute 106 and the Sentencing
Reform Act. 10 7 Under the saving statute, a new criminal statute that
repeals an older criminal statute shall not change the penalties incurred
under that older statute without clear expression in the repealing act.
100 Id. (citing Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 583 (1994)).
101Id. (citing Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) (because Congress
did not provide for retroactivity in the FSA, it should not "lightly ...be presumed"
by the courts)).
102 Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, and was joined by
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Scalia's dissent was
joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito. Dorsey, 132 S.Ct. at 2321.
103 Id. at 2323.
104 Id. at 2344 (In the end, the mischief of the Court's opinion
is not the result
in this particular case, but rather the unpredictability it injects into the law for the
future.).
105 Id. at 2325.
106 1 U.S.C. § 109.
107

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii).

The FSA did not expressly provide that it applied to pre-enactment
conduct. By contrast, under the Sentencing Reform Act, 108 the
applicable sentencing guidelines are those in effect on the date the
defendant is sentenced, regardless of when the criminal offense
occurred.
Justice Breyer outlined six factors that lead the Court to its
conclusion. First, the savings statute enables Congress to apply a new
statute's more lenient penalties to pre-dated conduct. 10 9 Second, the
Sentencing Reform Act applies when ex postfacto application would
occur-i.e., it would not have the disfavored retroactive effect of
increasing penalties. 110 Third, Congress's mandate for the Sentencing
Commission to change guidelines implies that it intended the
Sentencing Reform Act's background principle to apply.111 Fourth,
applying the former 100:1 ratio to pre-FSA crack offenders sentenced
after August 3, 2010, would create the very disparities in sentencing
for which the FSA was enacted to prevent. 112 Fifth, not applying the
FSA would result in disproportionate sentences, imposing higher
sentences for some and not others being sentenced at the same time,
under the FSA and ADAA. 113 Sixth, there were no countervailing
considerations that would support not applying the FSA
retroactively. 114
The concerns expressed by the dissent highlight the need for
Congress to communicate effectively with the Court to avoid
unpredictability when courts interpret future law. 115
The basis for these concerns is rooted in the express language
requirement of section 109 which mandates that Congress explicitly
state whether section 109 applies to ameliorative amendments to
trigger the general saving statute:
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to
release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or
liability incurred under such statute, unless the
repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such
statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for
108

Id.

109

Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2330-2336.

110 Id.

111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Dorsey,

132 S. Ct. at 2344.

the purpose of sustaining any proper action or
prosecution for the 11enforcement
of such penalty,
6
forfeiture, or liability.
Justice Scalia outlines that section 109 creates a "demanding
standard" which courts should not deviate from. 117 In addition, the

dissenting opinion outlines that none of the six factors the majority
identified overcame that standard individually; in sum, nor is there any
foundation for using a repeal by "implication" approach.1l l In prior
cases before the Court, it has used varying standards of interpretation:

fair implication, 119 clear implication, 12 expressly or by necessary
implication, 121 and the interpretation "must be clear enough
to
' 122
repeals."
implied
against
presumption
strong
court's]
[a
overcome
No legislative mandate prevents a prospective application of the
new law to pre-FSA offenders whose cases were pending while the
FSA was enacted. Although the FSA was enacted as an ameliorative
statute to be effective as soon as practicable, and discrepancies in
sentencing and data collection remain, 123 nothing indicates that the

absence of clear legislative intent on the issue or retroactivity was
something Congress forgot. Moreover, the dissent defers to Congress's
understanding of its role to be clear when drafting legislation. 124 In
other words, Congress is well aware of its duty to draft legislation that
clearly communicates its intent to courts, and without an express
116 1 U.S.C. § 109.
117 Dorsey, 132 S.Ct. at 2340.
118Id.
119 Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 659-664 (1974).
120 Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 218 (1910).
121Great Northern, 208 U.S. at 465.
122Dorsey, 132 S. Ct. at 2340 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein,
516 U.S. 367, 381 (1996); Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)).
123For example, the majority suggested that the U.S. Sentencing Commission
was directed to apply the FSA to "achieve consistency with other guideline
provisions and applicable law." Dorsey, 132 S.Ct. at 2324 (citing Fair Sentencing
Act § 8). In addition, the Sentencing Commission, in its history, has no settled
practice, so it is unlikely that Congress would rely on the Sentencing Commission to
sort out whether the "applicable law" was the pre- or post-FSA.
124The dissent also notes that the canons of construction, i.e., the rule of lenity
and the canon of constitutional avoidance do not apply because section 109 is
unambiguous and there is no constitutional issue that is in doubt. Dorsey, 132 S. Ct.
at 2344. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, CRISIS AND REFORM

276 (Harvard Univ. Press 1st ed. 1985) (noting that there is a canon to support every
possible result).

mandate that provides at least a clear implication of intent, courts may
adhere to a strict standard of literal interpretation.
D. Post-Dorsey Problems and the Smarter Sentencing Act

125

Although Dorsey answered the question of retroactivity, the
fundamental issue of fairness to those serving prison sentences who
otherwise would not be remains unanswered.
On December 19, 2013, President Obama commuted the
sentences of eight long-term federal prisoners who were sentenced for
crack cocaine offenses and were serving sentences that Congress
repudiated after their sentences when the FSA was passed. lZThe
sentences were commuted as "as an important step toward restoring
fundamental ideals of justice and fairness," and the President has since
urged Congress to pass legislation
that would make the FSA
12 7
retroactive for non-violent offenders.
By July 2013, an unusual alliance of Senate Democrats and
Republicans introduced the Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013 (SSA)
that would give judges more flexibility to determine prison sentences
in many drug cases.128
In 2014, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL) launched Clemency Project 2014, which will develop
criteria to help the Department of Justice identify prisoners who would
have received a substantially lower sentence if sentenced under current
laws. 129 The criteria for the initiative have been set by the Obama
Administration, and are geared towards prisoners serving federal
sentences for non-violent offenses that have served at least ten-year
prison sentences, have no significant
prior convictions, and have
1 30
demonstrated good conduct in prison.

125 S. 1410, 113th Cong. (2013).
126 Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President
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(Dec.
19,
2013),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/19/president-obama-grantspardons-and-commutation.
127 Charlie Savage, Obama Commutes Sentencesfor 8 in Crack Cocaine Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/us/obamacommuting -sentences -in-crack-cocaine-cases.html?_r=0.
121 S. 1410, 113th Cong. (2013).
129
Clemency Project Overview and FAQs, NAT'L Assoc. OF CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYERS, http://www.nacdl.org/clemencyproject/
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(last visited Apr. 8,

While Congress mulls over passing the SSA and the Obama
Administration looks to the NACDL for a solution, a similar problem
may be brewing over giving retroactive effect to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Miller v. Alabama,13 1 which held that mandatory sentences of
life without parole for juvenile offenders is prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment. 132 State courts have been split over whether Miller
applies retroactively. If it does, 2,000 inmates serving life sentences
could become eligible for parole. 133
III. GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION

The highly publicized school shooting in Newtown, Connecticut,
in 2012 sparked a national gun control debate. 134 This, following a
shooting in 2011 in Tucson, Arizona, that nearly killed former
Representative Gabrielle Giffords-and over a decade after the 1999
shooting at Columbine High School, resulted in lawmakers across the
nation introducing more than 500 gun-related bills in 2013. 135 Federal
legislation has failed to gain
support for passage, but some states have
136
laws.
new
enacted
already
Even with the lessons from the FSA, for example, some of the
proposed and enacted legislation remains unclear about retroactive
application of the new laws. Neither of the two prominent federal bills
included details of retroactivity. The Safe Communities, Safe Schools
Act of 2013137 introduced by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid,
includes effective date language taking effect "180 days after the

131
132

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
Linda Greenhouse, Crack Cocaine Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2014,

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/06/opinion/greenhouse-crack-cocainelimbo.html? r=0.
133 Id. See also Douglas Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness,and Finality
for Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 151 (2014).
134 Now is the Time to Do Something about Gun Violence, Office of the Press
Secretary,
WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/preventing-gunviolence (last visited May 4, 2013).
135 Id. See also Jack Nicas & Joe Palazzolo, Pro-Gun Laws Gain Ground,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/ article/SB100014241278873248
83604578398843653264474.html#project%3DGUNSTATES20130404%26articleTa
bs%3Darticle.
136 Jeremy W. Peters, Last Votes Tallied in Gun Debate, Senate Looks to Move
On, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/us/politics/
passing-2-measures-senate-winds-down-gun-debate.html?_r=0.
137 S. 649, 113th Cong. (2013).

enactment of this Act." 138 An earlier bill introduced by Senator Diane
Feinstein, the Assault Weapons Ban of 2013139 also lacked details
about retroactivity. The only detail Senator Feinstein's bill included
about timing was that the amendments
"shall take effect 90 days after
140
the date of enactment of this Act."
State legislation strengthening and weakening gun control laws
are generally no different. In Alabama where the proposals were to
weaken gun control laws, the only provision about enactment was that
the Act "shall become effective on the first day of the third month
following its passage and approval by the Governor, or its otherwise
becoming law." 14 1 In Maryland, the Firearm Safety Act of 2013142
took effect on October 1, 2013, and it includes no provision for
retroactivity. 143
CONCLUSION

With lessons unlearned from past legislative failures, the practical
consequences of ambiguous provisions could result in a repeat of what
defendants faced under the FSA. Along with uncertainty in the judicial
process and varying application of statutes, the administrative burden
on courts is certain to increase.
In the end, it is clear that when legislatures fail in their duty to
draft laws that comport with statutory requirements, courts are forced
to make judgments that could otherwise be avoided. Although the
textualist approach that Justice Scalia advocates is proper, when a
court is forced to interpret statutory ambiguities, society may be better
served when the purpose-driven approach prevails.
One of the next important issues likely to face Congress is
immigration reform. If Congress does not handle its legislative duty
with care, the detrimental impact could be far-reaching. Hopefully
Congress will learn from the lessons of the past. Otherwise, as with the
FSA, thousands would be subjected to unintended consequences, and
the courts will continue to operate on a slippery slope.
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